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What however, is that type of evil . . . which is suited to arouse disgust?                                                                       
Aurel Kolnai, On Disgust 
The monster’s body is a cultural body . . . a construct and projection. 
Jeremy Cohen, Monster Theory  
Disability, disgust and tropes of monstrosity are social constructions which 
are relative, fluid and context-dependent.
1
 They are variously and flexibly 
employed cross-culturally to label, reject, and eliminate certain persons 
and/or actions as deviant, dangerous, or evil.
2
 The association of disability 
with both supernatural and moral evil is of course a widespread trope in bib-
lical traditions. Demonic influence or divine discontent are the oft-cited back-
stories of those physical bodies which are assumed to fall short of cultural 
norms or ideals. In such contexts, stigmatisation of bodily difference often 
expresses the power and interests of a dominant elite (cultic) group.
3
 In po-
                                                          
1
 David Houk and Amos Kiewe confirm disability’s character when they write, “Dis-
ability is not written in the stars – or on the body; rather disability is a construction, de-
fined and negotiated by a culture at a given point in time. . . . To say this is not to deny the 
material fact of physical impairment; it is to affirm the fact that a physical impairment’s 
meaning is never fixed or given” (Davis W. Houck and Amos Kiewep, FDR's Body Poli-
tics: The Rhetoric of Disability [College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003], 5–
6). “Disgust” likewise “is never stable, never irrevocably fixed or certain” (Robert Wilson, 
The Hydra’s Tale: Imagining Disgust [Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2002], xiv).  
All scriptural quotations in this essay are from the NRSV unless noted otherwise. 
2
 Anthropological studies have revealed how cultural constructions of “evil” are also 
relative and fluid, so much so that some have appealed for the elimination of the term 
altogether. See David Parkin, ed., The Anthropology of Evil (New York: Blackwell, 1985). 
3
 On stigmatisation on account of bodily difference assumed to be the result of sin or 
divine punishment, see discussions in Saul Olyan, Disability in the Hebrew Bible: Inter-
preting Mental and Physical Differences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
and Louise Lawrence, Sense and Stigma in the Gospels: Depictions of Sensory-Disabled 
Characters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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lemical contexts, metaphors of disability also abound as effective ideological 
weapons to both shame and immobilize the “evil” represented by an oppo-
nent. In such contexts “evil” is disqualified, deprived of agency, and rendered 
ineffective through the employment of disordered corporeal concepts.
4
 Dis-
gust with its “unique aversive style”5 plays a substantive role in such strate-
gies by using intense bodily sensations to reject and limit the power of (per-
ceived) evil persons or things “to contaminate, infect or pollute by proximity, 
contact or ingestion.”6 In extreme cases, “monstrosity” – “some horrendous 
presence that explodes all . . . harmony, order, and ethical conduct”7 – is 
impressed onto such traditions. As the etymological root in the Latin mon-
strare meaning both “to show” and “to warn”8 indicates, the monstrous is 
used to counsel audiences about the threats posed to them by exaggerated, 
liminal, hybrid, and oft-times aberrant identities.  
Through a hermeneutical lens structured on the intersections of disability, 
disgust, and tropes of monstrosity, here I will probe the discursive and bodily 
act of expelling evil through the narration of the body of a notorious villain of 
the Second Temple period, Antiochus IV Epiphanes, as it is told in 2 Macc 
9:1─12. This narrative has long been seen to number among “death of tyrant 
type scenes” in which tormentors are brought to account for offending the 
divine,
9
 informing so-called “de mortibus persecutorum literature.”10 Rela-
                                                          
4
 On ascribing various disabilities to idols as a rhetorical tool to delegitimize them see 
Saul Olyan, “The Ascription of Physical Disability as a Stigmatizing Strategy in Biblical 
Iconic Polemics,” Journal of Hebrew Scriptures 9 (2009), 1–15; repr. in Disability Studies 
and Biblical Literature (eds. Candida Moss and Jeremy Schipper; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 89–102. 
5
 William Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1997), 9. 
6
 Miller, Anatomy, 2.  
7
 On monsters and monstrosity see assorted entries in Asa Simon Mittman and Peter J. 
Dendle, eds., The Ashgate Research Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2012). David Gilmore lists the following trans-cultural qualities frequently asso-
ciated with the concept: aggression, excess, malevolence, repugnance, violence and ata-
vism (David Gilmore, Monsters: Evil Beings, Mythical Beasts and All Manner of Imagi-
nary Terrors [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003]). See also Joseph 
Miller, The Power of Myth (New York: Doubleday, 1988). 
8
 Alexa Wright, Monstrosity: The Human Monster in Visual Culture (London: Taurus, 
2013), 3. 
9
 On this topos see Wesley Allen, The Death of Herod: The Narrative and Theological 
Function of Retribution in Luke–Acts (SBLDS 158; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 16; 
Thomas Africa, “Worms and the Death of Kings: A Cautionary Note on Disease and His-
tory,” Classical Antiquity 1:1 (1982): 1–17; David J. Ladouceur, “The Death of Herod the 
Great,” CP 76:1 (1981): 23–34. Also relevant in this regard is Arie W. Zwiep’s work on 
the death of Judas and its parallels to other deaths of wicked men: “The moral of these 
stories is clear: a wicked man deserves to die a wicked death, or even: a wicked man will 
die a wicked death. The gods/God will not let injustice prevail. A cruel death is in a sense 
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tively few commentators have, however, probed Antiochus’s actual embodied 
performance here.
11
 This is surprising given that 2 Macc 9 seems (in contrast 
to other narrations of Antiochus’s death) intentionally to foreground bodily 
materiality
12
 and invoke sensory stimuli
13
 to intrude as macabre spectacles 
from which the audience physically recoils. As will be seen, this passage 
ultimately vomits out Antiochus’s liminal body and the ontological, ideologi-
cal, and spatial crises it represents as an abhorrent, foul, and repugnant em-
bodiment of evil. 
A. Embodied Performances: Disability, Disgust and  
Tropes of Monstrosity 
Performance studies submit that categories such as gender, race, sexuality, 
ethnicity, and disability are not “static fact[s] of a [pre-cultural] body” but 
rather purposefully enacted constructions and reconstructions. Contra theo-
rists who have, following Mary Douglas’s influential work, 14  viewed the 
individual body as a neat reflection of a social body, recently the category of 
“lived bodies” has been employed to underscore embodiment’s “hybrid ter-
                                                          
an answer to the problem of theodicy” (Arie W. Zwiep, Judas and the Choice of Matthias: 
A Study on Context and Concern of Acts 1:15–26 [WUNT 2.187, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2004], 71).  
10
 Daniel Schwartz, 2 Maccabees: Commentaries on Early Jewish Literature (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 2008), 351.  
11
 One notable exception is the work of Alexandra Frisch. She probed a variety of narra-
tives concerning the death of kings and their use of worm imagery, rotting flesh, and fal-
ling bowels to promote a disgust reaction in the audience. Whilst I came across her work 
late in the day of writing this article, it nonetheless is a standpoint with which I concur and 
from which I can draw inspiration. She contends, “Stories of disgusting disease channel the 
contemplation of earthly power into the most natural of areas – the human body. While 
God necessarily remains part of the picture, these stories demonstrate an alternative way to 
theorize power dynamics in this period. Namely, ultimate power stems not only from 
God’s ability to punish, but also from how the people react to these punishments; God’s 
power is mediated and extended through the people” (Alexandra Frisch, “Worms, Rotting 
Flesh, and Falling Bowels: The Power of Disgust in a Motif of Kingly Death in Early 
Jewish Literature.” www.law.tau.ac.il/Heb/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/Frisch.pdf [2011]). 
Charles Higgins’s MA coursework which initiated a sensory reading of 2 Maccabees (Uni-
versity of Exeter, 2013) is another exception and has informed my thinking here. 
12
 On the importance of the oft-neglected area of materiality of the body in biblical 
studies, see Francesca Stavrakopoulou, “Making Bodies: On Body Modification and Rel i-
gious Materiality in the Hebrew Bible,” HeBAI 2 (2013): 532–53. 
13
 The senses are another largely underplayed area in biblical studies. See Lawrence, 
Sense, 10–30. 
14
 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Ta-
boo (London: Routledge, 1966). 
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rain.” Bodies are “contingent formations of space, time and materiality . . . 
assemblages of practices, discourses, images, situational arrangements, and 
specific places and projects.”15 In this perspective, as Francesca Stavrakopou-
lou’s recent work on body modification and the Hebrew Bible indicates, the 
body is neither constant or unequivocally symbolic but rather “a discursively 
engaged social project”; “a site of performativity, manifesting and embodying 
cultural preferences and anxieties.”16  
Disability when considered in this perspective is likewise not an “immuta-
ble, static [physical/mental] condition”17 but rather a powerful performance of 
social meaning. In biblical texts, those bodies rendered “other” to the ideal-
ised cultic norm – male, circumcised, fecund, able, and unblemished – are 
frequently sanctioned, stigmatised, and/or excluded. Saul Olyan contends that 
biblical literature variously employs binary discourses to “devalue disabled 
persons, and in some cases, restrict their social intercourse and their cultic 
opportunities, by casting them as “defective”, profaning of holiness, cursed, 
shamed, hated, polluting and ─ implicitly ─ ugly.”18 Disability and disease 
are also used in social discourse as a discursive vehicle for disorder, chaos, 
and a variety of social ills particularly in polemical contexts where these are 
often employed specifically to delegitimize opponents.
19
 Idols are portrayed 
as senseless (Ps 115:4–6; Jer 10:5) in contrast to the supra-able Yahweh,20 
and perceived opponents of biblical authors are frequently castigated as sen-
sory disabled in some way (Isa 3:12; 9:16; Matt 3:16–26).21 
If exclusionary practices and ideologies are often founded on the percep-
tion of bodily difference, then to cite one disability theorist, the reflex of 
“disgust is the bile carried in a discursive complex . . . [of] ableism.”22 Mar-
tha Nussbaum voices this connection too when she contends that disgust 
                                                          
15
 Margaret Lock and Judith Farquhar, eds., Beyond the Body Proper: Reading the An-
thropology of Material Life (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 1. 
16
 Stavrakopoulou, “Making,” 552. 
17
 Paul Jaeger and Cynthia Ann Bowman, Disability Matters: Legal and Pedagogical 
Issues of Disability in Education (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 20. 
18
 Olyan, Disability, 121. 
19
 See David Mitchell and Sandra Snyder’s work, which details how disabilities func-
tion as narrative “prosthetics” within literature (David Mitchell and Sandra Snyder, Narra-
tive Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse  [Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000]); an able body “still largely masquerades as a non-identity, as the 
natural order of things” (Robert McCruer and Michael Berube, Crip Theory: Cultural 
Signs of Queerness and Disability [Albany: New York University Press, 2006], 1).   
20
 See Olyan, “Ascription,” 1–15.   
21
 See Lawrence, “Sense,” 31–56.  
22
 Bill Hughes, “Civilising Modernity and the Ontological Invalidation of Disabled 
People,” in Disability and Social Theory: New Developments and Directions  (eds. Dan 
Goodley, Bill Hughes,and Lennard Davis; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 17–
32, 21. 
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often empowers the procedure of “othering” by diminishing and degrading 
certain identity groups.
23
 Disgust is a term which conjures up the visceral and 
primordial. The Oxford English Dictionary records its origins in the Latin dis- 
(“expressing reversal”) and gustus (“taste”). As a noun it denotes a sensory 
prompt and response: “a feeling of revulsion or strong disapproval aroused by 
something unpleasant or offensive”; as a verb it “cause[s] (someone) to feel 
revulsion or strong disapproval.”24 Theorists in various disciplines have long 
tried to establish the character of disgust.
25
 For Charles Darwin it was linked 
to oral ingestion; those beings who could discern putrid substances through 
sensory input had better chances of survival. For the social historian William 
Miller, accounting in part for the marked cross-cultural differences observed 
surrounding disgust-inducing phenomena, it is a multi-sensory phenomenon 
which goes beyond merely the mouth and taste: “It also involves – not just by 
extension but at its core – smell, touch, even at times sight and hearing. 
Above all, it is a moral and social sentiment . . . It ranks people and things in 
a kind of cosmic ordering.”26 Psychologist Paul Rozin similarly acknowl-
edges that disgust’s significant cultural and religious capital develop “from a 
system to protect the body from harm to a system to protect the soul from 
harm.”27 Psychological anthropologist John Ingham concurs that it is not only 
part of an “emotional apparatus of defence” but also cross-culturally a power-
ful vehicle of morality and sociality with symbolic potential traversing realms 
such as “pollution, incest, and death.”28 Whilst many of these thinkers seem 
to be implicitly assuming Cartesian dichotomies of body/soul and physi-
cal/moral (a distinction which also underlines Douglas’s emphasis on the 
                                                          
23
 Martha Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), and Martha Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity: 
Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
24
 Oxford English Dictionary available online at www.oed.com. 
25
 Thomas Kazen cites disgust triggers to include “food, body products, animals, sexual 
behaviours, contact with death or corpses, violations of the exterior envelope of the body 
(including gore and deformity), poor hygiene, interpersonal contamination (contact with 
unsavoury human beings) and certain moral offences.” He notes that whilst some have 
contended that this reflects a peculiarly Western model, others have recognised that at least 
some of these elements seem to be replicated cross-culturally and therefore could be linked 
to “cultural evolution and socialization” (Thomas Kazen, “Dirt and Disgust: Body and 
Morality in Biblical Purity Laws,” in Perspectives on Purity and Purification in the Bible 
(eds. Naphtali Meshel et al.; New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 43–64, 53.  
26
 Miller, Anatomy, 2. 
27
 Paul Rozin et al., “Disgust: Preadaption and the Cultural Evolution of a Food Based 
Emotion,” in Food Preferences and Taste: Continuity and Change (ed. Helen M. Macbeth; 
New York: Berghahn Books, 1997), 65–82, 65. 
28
 John M. Ingham, Psychological Anthropology Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 33. 
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individual body/social body),
29
 disgust actually destabilizes such dualisms. 
First, disgust is performing as a frontier, policing borders by identifying “the 
presence of a particular quality of the unethical, namely, the morally ‘putrid’ 
or ‘putrescent’” and, second, it is a violent expulsive (integrating, not separat-
ing, the physical and moral in its “rejection . . . or elimination”).30 For this 
reason, Rozin saw “core disgust” comprised of “oral incorporation, offen-
siveness and contamination potency,”31 furnishing ideologies related to “ani-
mal-reminder/existential aspects of disgust” and thus “revulsion centred on 
stimuli that function as death/mortality reminders” such as  gore, deformity, 
hygiene, death); meanwhile he saw “socio-moral disgust” as “revulsion cen-
tred on moral and social judgments.”32 Like disability, then, disgust “leaks” 
beyond neatly bounded physiological or sensory terrains into the arena of 
morality. 
Disgust has received relatively little attention in biblical scholarship
33
 de-
spite an interesting psychoanalytic experiment by Robert Galatzer-Levy and 
Mayer Gruber, in which the Hebrew Bible was probed on disgust imagery.
34
 
They set out to challenge the theory that disgust was an effective response 
only to conceptual chaos rather than a response directly connected to a con-
crete physical or sensory experience, particularly related to food. Gruber 
draws on this earlier work in the entry on “Abomination” in The Dictionary 
of Deities and Demons, which speaks about texts which refer to deities and 
their cult objects as “disgusting objects.” Disgust is evoked to “repel Israel-
ites, who might otherwise be tempted to worship prohibited deities. In the 
same way Leviticus 18 asserts that various types of sexual relations  . . . are 
                                                          
29
 Douglas, Purity.  
30
 Richard Beck, Unclean: Meditations on Purity, Hospitality, and Mortality (Eugene: 
Wipf and Stock, 2011), 26.  
31
 Kazen, “Perspectives,” 53. 
32
 Beck, Unclean, 19.  
33
 Hugh Pyper uses “disgust” in his elucidation of “the biology of offence” through 
which he probes the offensiveness of Scripture (Hugh Pyper, The Unchained Bible: Cul-
tural Appropriations of Biblical Texts [London: T&T Clark, 2012], esp. 17–31). Amy 
Kalmanofsky, in her reading of “terror” in Jeremiah, identifies disgust and fear as central 
elements of the horror genre. She submits that shame discourse echoes emotional responses 
to fear and disgust: by shaming the audience, Jeremiah’s prophetic call moves his listeners 
not only ideologically but also emotionally and physiologically to embrace his agenda 
(Amy Kalmanofsky, Terror All around: The Rhetoric of Horror in the Book of Jeremiah 
[New York: T&T Clark, 2008]).  
34
Robert M. Galatzer-Levy and Mayer Gruber, “What an Affect Means: A Quasi-
Experiment about Disgust,” Annual of Psychoanalysis 20 (1992): 69–92; cited by Erin 
Runions, “From Disgust to Humor: Rahab’s Queer Affect,” in Bible Trouble: Queer Read-
ing at the Boundaries of Biblical Scholarship (eds. Teresa Hornby and Ken Stone; SemSt 
67; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 45–74, 45. 
 Evil and the Body of Antiochus IV Epiphanes 7 
so repulsive that they make even the personified land of Israel vomit.”35 Illicit 
sexual practice is thus retched from the earth as rancid food is vomited from 
the body. A cursory look at biblical texts on the semantic range of “disgust” 
likewise reveals arrestingly physical and sensory responses and reprimands of 
perceived evil. The plagues of Exodus envision the destruction of the Nile’s 
fish stock and the river itself emitting a stink so nauseous that the Egyptians 
will be loathed/offended at drinking its water (Exod 7:18). Psalm 107:8 pic-
tures the sinner’s sickness and afflictions as drawing near the gates of death 
and being loathed/disgusted (בַעָתּ) at food. Amos pictures the divine chastis-
ing the people for turning away from him by making the stench (שֺׁאְבּ) of their 
camp intrude their nostrils (Amos 4:10). Isaiah warns that God’s punishment 
of evil will include the transformation of “sweet perfume” to a “rotten odour” 
(קָמ) (Isa 3:24). Moab wallows in his own vomit (אֵק) “because he magnified 
himself against Yahweh” (Jer 48:26) and God spits (ἐμέσαι) the lukewarm 
believer from his mouth (Rev 3:16). 
Thomas Kazen’s psycho-biological work, which adopts insights from cog-
nitive science and evolutionary biology as heuristic tools to interpret Penta-
teuchal legal collections, develops these sorts of links.
36
 In an essay entitled 
“Dirt and Disgust: Body and Morality in Biblical Purity Laws,”37 he probes 
the interrelation between modes of ritual and moral “impurity” and considers 
“the possibility of morality as well as purity originating with primary emo-
tional bodily reactions.”38 He hypothesises that priestly legal codes may have 
had their origin in “negative reactions to threatening stimuli” (though these of 
course are socially-conditioned in specific contexts) and “the emotion of 
disgust, primarily towards objectionable substances, and secondarily to states 
associated with such substances or behaviour evoke similar feelings.”39 This 
embodied approach to purity laws in particular conceptualises regulations as 
contact-contagions, hence the various proscriptions surrounding the ingestion 
of certain life forms, sexual acts, and idolatrous worship. Disgust strategies 
identified include rejection, regulation, and permanent removal. Dealing as he 
is with textual material, Kazen also highlights the suggestive role of memory 
in literary evocations of disgust, for “disgust may be triggered by the mere 
thought of a number of situations, with neither taste, nor smell or touch actu-
ally being there.”40  
                                                          
35
 Mayer Gruber, “Abomination,” DDD 2–3, 3.  
36
 See Thomas Kazen, Emotions in Biblical Law: A Cognitive Science Approach (Shef-
field: Sheffield Phoenix, 2011); also Kazen, “Dirt,” 43–64. 
37
 Kazen, “Dirt,” 43–64. 
38Kazen, “Dirt,” 45. Martha Nussbaum’s work also looks at how emotions shape and in-
fluence social morality and customs (see Nussbaum, Hiding).  
39Kazen, “Dirt,” 45. 
40
 Kazen, “Dirt,” 53.  
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These ideological prompts also call to mind tropes of the monstrous – 
“portraits of scorn and disgust”41 – which have impacted in part discourses 
surrounding “othered” bodies. The monster is a manifestation of extreme 
difference from a norm – ideological, religious, cultural, racial or bodily – 
hence its recurrent associations with disease and disability.
42
 Like disability, 
of course, monstrosity is not an essential category: “In some cases the mon-
ster is all body, in others disembodied spirit. In some cases the monster is 
quite real in the conventional sense, even if amplified, and in others, clearly 
fictional or mythical.” 43 What is particularly significant given our present 
theme are the ways in which tropes of the monstrous often furnish perform-
ances of exclusion in social discourse. Other peoples, communities, and bod-
ies can be transformed into beasts and monsters in order to display their ma-
levolence. Pramod Nayar cites the biblical portrayal of the “the aboriginal 
inhabitants of Canaan, as giants”44 in Numbers 13:33 as an example of such a 
trope.
45
 Similar moves are also discernible in Ezekiel’s depiction of Pharoah 
as an unwieldy monster (Ezek 29:3; 32:2). In the words of Timothy Beal, 
“This Pharonic sea monster is about to be turned into just one more filet of 
fish while God  . . . revels in the blood and guts. In Ezekiel’s gory prophetic 
imagination to call a nation by the name of a chaos monster is to pronounce 
its death sentence.”46  
                                                          
41
 Asa Simon Mittman, “Introduction: The Impact of Monsters and Monster Studies,” in 
Ashgate Research, 1–16, 13. 
42
 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson writes, “Although the term has expanded to encompass 
all forms of social and corporeal aberration, monster originally described people with 
congenital impairments. As departures from the normatively human, monsters were seen as 
category violations, or grotesque hybrids” (Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, “Integrating 
Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory,” in Feminist Disability Studies [ed. Kim Hall; 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011], 13–47, 13). Michelle Hanson also notes 
how from ancient times, the monstrous body was an object of terror and alarm. She cites 
Roman law, dating from the fifth century B.C.E, that a father would put to death a child 
“monster . . . a form different from that of members of the human race” (Michelle Hanson, 
“Monsters In Our Midst: An Examination of Human Monstrosity in Fiction and Film of the 
United States” (PhD diss., University of Nevada at Las Vegas, 2012); available online at 
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2573&context=thesesdissert
ations). 
43
 Mittman “Introduction,” 9. See also Beck, Unclean, 93. 
44
 Pramod K. Nayar, Posthumanism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 83. 
45
 Psalm 74 likewise envisions Israel’s foes as chaos monsters who have “roared within 
your holy place” but trusts that the God who “crushed the heads of the Leviathan” will 
likewise overthrow them. Psalm 89 depicts the enemy as Rahab “crushed like a carcass” 
and Isa 51 recalls Yahweh’s triumph over monsters “in [the] hope of rousing God against a 
new monstrous enemy” (Timothy K. Beal, Religion and Its Monsters [New York: 
Routledge, 2002], 30). 
46
 Beal, Religion, 31. Biblical portrayals of the monstrous are of course a part of a 
broader cultural landscape (ranging from Ugarit to Mesopotamia). Mark Smith’s work in 
 Evil and the Body of Antiochus IV Epiphanes 9 
As a discursive project, the monstrous is quite hard to define concretely. 
Jeremy Cohen’s model of so-called “monster culture” is an instructive heuris-
tic tool in this respect.
47
 He notes the following characteristics surrounding 
the performance of monstrosity, which I have abstracted into categories 
which relate to modes of hybrid and liminal embodiment across (a) ontologi-
cal boundaries, (b) ideological boundaries, and (c) spatial boundaries. 
(a) Ontological Boundaries 
The monster is a harbinger of a category crisis: “a mixed category, the mon-
ster resists any classification built on hierarchy or merely binary opposition . . 
. a dangerous hybrid . . . a form suspended between forms.”48 Ontology sig-
nals proper distinctions between forms of being: animal/human; hu-
man/divine etc. It also foregrounds the boundary between being (life) and 
non-being (death). 
(b) Ideological Boundaries 
The monster’s body is a cultural body: “an embodiment of a certain cultural 
moment” (intellectual, religious, sexual etc.). 49  The monster dwells at the 
gates of difference: “any kind of alterity can be inscribed across (constructed 
through) the monstrous body, but for the most part monstrous difference 
tends to be cultural, political, racial, economic [and] sexual.”50  
(c) Spatial Boundaries 
The monster polices the borders of the possible: “the monster prevents mobil-
ity: delimiting the social spaces through which private bodies may move.”51 
Fear of the monster is a kind of desire: “the monster is continually linked to 
forbidden practices, in order to normalize and enforce.”52 Spatial boundaries 
                                                          
particular plots the continuum of “Gods” from anthropomorphic deities (“centre” and 
“benevolent”) to barbarous monsters (“periphery” and “destructive”). See Mark Smith, The 
Origins of Biblical Monotheism: Israel’s Polytheistic Background and the Ugaritic Texts 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
47
 Jeffrey Cohen, Monster Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
Two additional categories in Cohen’s model, not explicitly employed here, are “the mon-
ster always escapes” and “the monster stands at the threshold of becoming.” 
48
 Cohen, Monster, 6–7. 
49
 Cohen, Monster, 4. 
50
 Cohen, Monster, 7.  
51
 Cohen, Monster, 12.  
52
 Cohen, Monster, 16. 
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encapsulate not only walls, borders, open spaces and the built environment 
but also cultural and political borders between peoples.
53
 
The specific intersections of disability, disgust and tropes of monstrosity in 
particular contexts, as will become clear, are multifaceted and complex. At a 
fundamental level, these elements index performances of “multiple marginal-
ities.” 54  Frequently they coalesce in discourses which aim to subvert the 
power of “evil” persons, practices, nations, and regimes by evoking, through 
embodied performances and sensory means, an aversive and prohibitive re-
flex towards such in others. Those who contravene ontological, ideological, 
and spatial norms are expelled as aggressive, malevolent, and excessive “so-
cial threat[s] and danger[s].”55 Unlike decorous discussions of vice or evil, 
disability, disgust, and monstrosity “force upon us the [materiality of the] 
body, nauseating sights and odours; suppuration, defecation . . .  rot.”56 It is to 
such repugnant sensory encounters that 2 Macc 9:1–12 invites its listeners.   
B. Evil and the Body of Antiochus IV Epiphanes  
(2 Macc 9:1─12) 
In this “lurid account,”57 the Seleucid king Antiochus IV Epiphanes and his 
wicked campaign to obliterate and eradicate Jewish religion, life, and people 
meet a grisly end. In Daniel Schwartz’s terms, the author, “enjoying himself 
immensely – settles the Jew’s account with Antiochus IV Epiphanes.”58 A 
litany of horrors – violation of temple, imposition of forbidden foods, self-
aggrandizement, blasphemy, and sadistic butchering of his resistors – is fi-
nally met in 2 Macc 9 with divine retribution. Following his humiliating “re-
treat in disorder” from Persia (9:1) and the news concerning Nicanor’s defeat 
(9:3), the narrative exhibits Antiochus’s fury and murderous intentions to-
wards the Jews (9:4). Despite God torturously attacking his guts, Antiochus, 
enflamed “with rage,” commands that his chariot drives still faster, following 
which he is plunged headfirst from it, so much so that every member of his 
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body is tormented (9:7). Next his form is swarmed “with worms” (9:8) and in 
anguish his flesh decomposes. On account of his fetid odour, his army, and 
then he himself, is revolted by his body. Stinking and crushed, Antiochus 
capitulates with the words: “It is right to be subject to God; mortals should 
not think that they are equal to God” (9:12).  
Larry Helyer has posited 2 Maccabees as a “pathetic history,” specifically 
crafted to move the reader emotionally: 
One could justifiably label this work a romantic melodrama . . . on the one hand he milks 
the last drop of horror and compassion out of the story of the martyrdom of a mother and 
her seven sons; on the other, he narrates the demise of Antiochus Epiphanes the arch-
enemy with a slapstick humour worthy of the Three Stooges.
59
  
In chorus with Kazen’s work cited earlier, the narrative also, by evoking 
specific sensory prompts, seeks to move the audience to “corporealize dis-
like.” 60  Whilst much ink has been spilled trying to “diagnose” the actual 
medical condition which may have lain behind the symptoms catalogued 
here, including “perforation of the gut with peritonitis and subsequent abscess 
formation” only exacerbated by the fall, or as a result of internal injuries 
sustained in the fall – “the wounds, the bruises, became gangrenous, whole 
pieces fell off, and an intolerable stench  developed”61 – what cannot be de-
nied is how these symptoms endow the author with potent tools to invoke 
rejection of Antiochus’s rule and identity. It has long been recognised that 
there exists a marked figurative association between the body and politics and 
as such “the human [diseased/disabled] body has been frequently associated 
with political and social disorder.”62 Susan Sontag’s thesis that disease meta-
phors often conceive of the body invaded by an alien force makes clear the 
penchant for using disease and disability politically.
63
 Antiochus’s “shameful 
retreat” (9:2) in “disorder” (ἀκόσμως), which opens the chapter, introduces 
the crippling “politicization of corporeality,” 64  which will be developed 
therein.  
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I. Ontological Boundaries 
Recalling Cohen’s categorisations of the monstrous body as a locus of “cate-
gory crisis,”65 Jerry Truex’s description of Antiochus in 2 Maccabees as “a 
career blasphemer, a theomachos [fighter of God] and a divine pretender”66 
hints at the sorts of hybridity and borders which structure the monstrosity 
presented here. The text repeatedly underscores the magnified hubris of a 
man whose name and nature undergirded his own propagandist identity as a 
God “made manifest.” Superhuman arrogance (τὴν ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον 
ἀλαζονείαν) lay behind his conviction that he could “command the waves of 
the sea,” “weigh the high mountains in a balance” (9:8) and “touch the stars 
of heaven” (9:10). Given that ancient cosmologies often considered astral 
elements to be composed of different material from the earth,
67
 this latter 
statement could hint at Antiochus’s own self-conceived transcendence of the 
human realm. In relation to the sea, Truex cites Goldstein’s recognition of an 
allusion to Xerxes here, who likewise challenged divine order “by bridging 
the Hellespont and digging a central canal through Mount Athos,” 68  thus 
embodying, in Susan Cole’s words, “a sacrilegious” and “impious liminal-
ity.”69 In short, there is a forced disruption of divine/human boundaries in 
Antiochus’s body; a figure who wished to be “lauded in life as a ‘god mani-
fest’” here, with arrestingly stomach-churning images, ironically makes “the 
power of God manifest.”70   
Boundaries of life and death also feature prominently in Antiochus’s per-
formances in this chapter, which centre not only on his seeping corpse-like 
form, but also his noxious stench. Antiochus’s body “swarms with worms” 
and, while living, his flesh decays and rots away (9:9). In biblical traditions, 
worms frequently crawl over the dead (Isa 14:11; 66:24), and engulf the con-
temptible, wicked, and debased (Ps 22:6).
71
 The contamination reflexes asso-
ciated with disgust, however, are perhaps most acutely brought into play in 
the chapter by references to Antiochus’s intolerable odour (2 Macc 9:9, 12). 
Foul smells in the ancient world indicated both disease – hence Galen’s in-
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structions to physicians to use olfaction in diagnoses and treatments of disor-
ders
72
 – and the pollution of death (Eccl 10:1; Isa 34:3).73 Olfactory methods 
were therefore fitting metaphors by which one could “other” opponents,74 and 
part of the procedures by which the ideologically “pure” could disassociate 
themselves from the “polluted.” 75  Underlining the severity of the disgust 
reflex here is the fact that it is not enemies but Antiochus’s own troops and he 
himself who are revolted at his smell (9:9, 12). This facilitates a direct con-
trast with the aroma of the martyr’s body in 2 Macc 7 who is burnt in a caul-
dron and from which “the smoke from the pan spread widely” (7:5). The 
audience is implicitly encouraged to construe this as a fragrant smoke of 
sacrifice indicative of life-affirming righteous worship (Gen 8:21; Exod 
29:18; Num 28:6) and hence the arresting reverse of the stagnant whiff ema-
nating from the flesh of the “undead” oppressor. 
II. Ideological Boundaries  
For Cohen the monstrous body is the manifestation of a specific cultural in-
stance.
76
 That instance for this author is in part the violent atrocities inflicted 
on Jewish bodies (forced eating of non-kosher food; brutalising torture) in 
enforced Hellenisation.
77
 Ideological concerns are intensely stirred up by the 
announcement of Antiochus’s genocidal intent to “make Jerusalem a ceme-
tery of Jews” (9:4).78 Jewish sensibilities are powerfully invoked in this jar-
ring scene of the colonisation of the holy city by decaying corpses, which, in 
Julia Kristeva’s words, constitutes “the utmost abjection.”79 Deviant sexuality 
and idolatry may also be being implied here given Antiochus’s dedication of 
the temple to Olympian Zeus earlier in the book (2 Macc 6:2). Schwartz notes 
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that πολυανδρεῖον, literally “place of many men,” could also be used of 
brothels.
80
 The ideologies surrounding what Rozin termed “animal-
reminder/existential aspects” and “socio-moral aspects” of disgust here there-
fore coalesce. 
The cultural/ideological boundary between “Jewish/Hellenistic” is also 
magnified in this chapter to divine proportions: the power of God is pitted 
against the ineffectual power of Antiochus’s regime. The author introduces 
the “all-seeing” God (9:5) as a direct contrast to Antiochus’s increasingly 
debilitated and senseless perception. “All seeing” holds connotations of om-
niscience and divine justice;
81
 the latter may also harbour cultural associa-
tions surrounding the evil eye – “the ability to cause illness, misfortune or 
death”82 through the ocular organ – and posits “seeing” as a sense suffused 
with the energy to curse and maim. Stavrakopoulou cites Ancient West Asian 
evil eye beliefs and “motifs concerning the devouring of human flesh (Deut 
28:54, 56; Qoh 4:4–8),”83 which could provide an intriguing equivalence here 
with the rotting of Antiochus’s flesh under the eyes of this supra-able God.84 
With not only penetrating [in]sight but also consummate power, God goes 
on to inflict incurable tortures on his victim’s innards. Dean Deppe notes how 
internal tortures often paid witness to the horrors of a person’s life. He cites 
Jehoram’s “loathsome” death (2 Chr 21:18–19) as a parallel here. 85 Notably 
the conception of the innards as the seat of emotion may also have links to 
physiological responses to intense bodily and sensory prompts.
86
 Second 2 
Maccabees 9 explicitly links these tortures to the anguish inflicted on the 
“bowels (σπλάγχνα also denoting intestines and seat of emotions) of others” 
(2 Macc 9:6) and therefore stimulates comparisons between the tortures An-
tiochus meted out on his victims and the divine torture to which he himself is 
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now subject. It is worth recalling Elaine Scarry’s seminal work on torture 
here, which denotes three features of the process: 
First, pain is inflicted on the person in ever-intensified ways. Second, the pain, continually 
amplified within the person’s body, is also amplified in the sense that it is objectified, 
made visible to those outside the person’s body. Third, the objectified pain is denied as 
pain and is read as power, a translation made possible by the obsessive mediation of 
agency.
87
 
The ultimate aim of torture is, in Scarry’s words, to transform “the objectified 
elements of pain into the insignia of power. . . into an emblem of the regime’s 
strength.”88 It is significant then that whilst the divine tortures ultimately do 
“disable” and subjugate Antiochus’s body and resolve, the tortures directed 
by Antiochus on seven brothers and their mother for their resistance to forced 
eating of pork (7:1) do not mediate his power, but rather also function as 
testimonies to divine strength. The brothers’ bodies are variously whipped, 
disfigured, scalped, and burnt but they remain unshakeable in their conviction 
that God will restore their bodies in the resurrection and that their tormentor 
will have no share in that existence, instead enduring torturous agonies. Con-
tra the pain being objectified and translated as the oppressor’s agency, the 
one whose tongue is cut out ably speaks through his other brothers and his 
mother who collectively and triumphantly assert: “The Lord God is watching 
over us and in truth has compassion on us. . . .” (7:6). Anathea Portier-Young 
also underscores the sensory ability of the martyrs when she notes that all 
“resisted the destruction of language by speaking what they knew to be true”; 
all adamantly guarded bodily margins “refusing to ingest the pork that was 
offered and even forced into their mouths” and all retained their eyesight and 
insistence on “the provident gaze of God.”89  
The mother’s exhortation to her sons to die graciously in the knowledge of 
God “the Creator of the world” who “will in his mercy give life and breath 
back to you” (7.23) is received by Antiochus as an assault (ironically inflicted 
by a female) on his honour. The narrator reveals that Antiochus felt “he was 
being treated with contempt and he was suspicious of her reproachful tone” 
(7:24). This provokes consideration of ideological boundaries surrounding 
gender. Stephen Moore and Janice Capel Anderson’s work on masculinity has 
relevance here. They identify “mastery of others – and/or of oneself” as the 
“definitive masculine trait in most of the Greek and Latin literary and phi-
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losophical texts that survive from antiquity.”90 Thus, the outstanding compo-
sure and self-control shown by those tortured (including the mother) are indi-
cations of their masculinity. The author underscores this point by interjecting 
when narrating the mother’s speech that “she reinforced her woman’s (θῆλυν) 
reasoning with a man’s (ἄρσενι) courage” (7.21). In stark contrast to this 
image of self-control, Antiochus’s act of torture is itself feminised – “charac-
terised by excess”91 – as is his failure to manage his volatile and unruly pas-
sions. He is featured as being “transported with rage” (7:4) and as such ideo-
logically associated with women, children and other weak bodies who “did 
not have a full role to play in the body politic.”92 Worse still, he is shown to 
be “breathing fire in his rage” (7:7). Schwartz highlights that “fire breathing” 
is a markedly vivid means to depict emotion and may reflect “folkloristic 
notions of dragons.”93 Leviathan for instance was also said to breathe fire 
(Job 41:18–23). By casting Antiochus’s disposition in such chaotic and un-
ruly terms, the author of 2 Maccabees is intentionally derogating (and mon-
stering) his character.  
Craig Williams’s model of ancient masculinity/femininity also adds activ-
ity/passivity and hardness/softness to the aforementioned traits of modera-
tion/excess and control/uncontrollability.
94
 In terms of activity, the seven 
martyrs are characterised by a bold performative agency and defiance in the 
face of torture, offering commanding verbal ripostes to the physical violence. 
In contrast, Antiochus, when subject to divine torture, is characterised as 
passive and ineffectual. His physical form is characterised as soft and porous 
– when falling “hard” his delicate form is crushed (9:7) and he starts to leak 
“dangerous” bodily substances (9:8) – two well-known feminizing traits.95 
Ultimately in spite of his arrogance he is “brought down to earth and carried 
in a litter, making the power of God manifest to all” (9:8) and his only direct 
speech is his ultimate surrender to God and recognition of his own mortality 
(9:12).  
III. Spatial Boundaries 
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Antiochus’s chaotic retreat from the city of Persepolis and his thwarted jour-
ney from Ecbatana to Jerusalem – “to make [it] . . . a cemetery of Jews” (9:4) 
– spatially frame the narrative here. Throughout the bulk of the chapter, by 
implication, he traverses uninhabited, wild space and eventually, deserted by 
his troops and “by a most pitiable fate,” ends his life “among the mountains 
in a strange land” (9:28). Although assuming at the outset the power of impe-
rial conquest and control of urban centres, his disordered recoil to marginal 
lands ultimately affirms his banishment as “subjugated” and “other.” 
Spatial politics are of course informed by cultural traditions which attend 
to the production and reproduction of space and borders. Antiochus’s own 
fleshly borderlands violated appropriate spatial separations laid down in 
Levitical law (foreign; uncircumcised; diseased; emitting bodily fluids etc.) 
which Douglas posited as the frontiers of purity and danger.
96
 Moreover, 
internal/external limits also play an important role here, as the body whose 
confines have been breached literally leaks through the skin. Some cuts (like 
circumcision) marked the body as sacralised. Other modifications of the body 
through “disease or deformity, mutilation of the limbs or the senses”97 pro-
voked revulsion and loathing.
98
 Whilst the divine striking of Antiochus is said 
to be “invisible” (9:5), the narrator nonetheless goes on to externalise his 
wounded internal organs and deathly corrosion to such an extent that they 
constitute a freakish exhibit for the audience (9:9). To intentionally employ 
an anachronistic term here, Antiochus’s “necropolitics” – the “subjugation of 
life to the power of death”99 – most violently implemented (but also resisted) 
in Eleazar and the seven martyr’s deaths, are here totally inverted. God is 
established as the ultimate sovereign power with the right to determine who 
shall die and who shall fester as “living dead.” 
The Jerusalem temple was central within the Jewish spatial universe as the 
touchstone of divine/human encounter. Antiochus’s assault and desecration of 
this place – stealing holy vessels, covering the altar with “abominable offer-
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ings forbidden by the laws” and ultimately dedication to Olympian Zeus (2 
Macc 6:1–11) – therefore constituted a contravention of monstrous propor-
tions. For when the temple was compromised “the whole world was thrown 
out of kilter.”100 In these actions not only did Antiochus transgress sacred 
space, he also “threatened to sever the link between heaven and earth,”101 thus 
interfering with divine order by scandalously assuming God’s privileges as 
his own. Daniel Schwartz significantly probes the vertical/horizontal dialectic 
further in his article “Why did Antiochus have to Fall?”102 Whilst this ques-
tion is prompted by the narration of Antiochus’s physical fall from the chariot 
(9:7), Schwartz establishes cosmological overtones here also. He sees the 
author assimilating Antiochus’s fate to the King of Babylon’s fall from 
heaven in Isaiah 14. In Schwartz’s words, the “fall from a somewhat elevated 
platform was his way of achieving his goal as best as possible, just as v. 8 
gave him the opportunity to allow Antiochus’s fall to match, tit for tat, his 
earlier ‘soaring.’”103 Interestingly, the King of Babylon’s fall from heaven 
reaches its climax in corpse abuse, when his corpse is disinterred from its 
wormy grave to become “loathsome carrion” and trampled underfoot  (Isa 
14:11, 19). This trope plays a part in the insistence that this earthly king is not 
a god (immortal) but can and will die; hence the emphasis on the materiality 
of the corpse and thus, in Antiochus’s case, the corpse-like body. In short, 
both odious divine pretenders plummet physically as well as socially. 
For Cohen, the monstrous is persistently related to realms of the prohibited 
“in order to normalize and enforce”104 culturally accepted practices. Many 
commentators have noted that the crises faced in Maccabean traditions were 
as much intra-Jewish as Jewish/foreign: “It was conflict with other Jews who 
were mixing (with Greek thought as well as Greek women).”105 Infringing 
boundaries of space, place, cult, and cosmos here, Antiochus’s figure func-
tions as a physical, social and political warning to those who would do like-
wise. The “all-seeing” Lord God of Israel (9:5) ultimately asserts his suprem-
acy, and the abominable (9:13), exaggerated, malevolent, murdering blas-
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phemer (9:28) “comes to his senses” (9:12) and ultimately concedes his sur-
render and ruin. 
C. The Repugnance of Evil 
If one were asked to select from biblical traditions (a) a disabled character 
and (b) a monster, Antiochus IV Epiphanes, at least as described in 2 Macc 
9:1–12, would not perhaps have sprung too easily to mind for either cate-
gory.
106
 Are not “disabled” characters the blind, the lame, the lepers, and 
other “deformed” figures lurking passively on the margins of biblical tradi-
tions? Are not “monsters” the stuff of apocalyptic imaginations: slippery 
serpents, seven-headed ocean dwellers, and contorted animal hybrids? Well, 
yes and no. What this discussion has shown is that neither of these categories 
is fixed or stable, neither are the bodies which each can be presumed to in-
clude. “Disabled” and “monster” are not “nouns” but rather “verbs,” denoting 
not the “persons” but rather the “actions” of bodily performances. The discur-
sively constructed body therefore can be both strategically “disabled” and 
“monstered” in the service of eradicating the evil it is presumed to constitute. 
Cohen rightly noted that cultural or ideological difference was a powerful 
mechanism for such moves: “A political figure . . . is transformed like an 
unwilling participant in a science experiment by the appointed historians of a 
replacement regime.”107 
It has been established that Antiochus’s body (and indeed the bodies of the 
martyrs and God’s body) here are variously employed as sites in which “con-
flicting cultural impulses me[e]t and clash.”108 The arrogant king, who dan-
gerously flaunted ontological, ideological, and spatial boundaries, is “brought 
back to earth in a very real and excruciating way to understanding God’s 
power.”109 The myriad evils that he is presumed to represent – hubris, self-
aggrandisement, blasphemy, idolatry, terror, persecution – are in 2 Macc 9:1–
12 freakishly paraded in his diseased, leaky, and fallen [de]formed body 
which is literally “inscribed [with] deviant morality.” 110  Through specific 
indexing of sensory assaults, this text constructs for its audience a new mode 
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of perception and encounter with this tyrant’s body. For whilst, as Miller 
noted, “all emotions are launched by some perception; only disgust [in react-
ing to intense sensory and bodily offence] makes the process of perceiving 
the core of its enterprise.”111 Disgust, a bodily and emotional reflex “pregnant 
with death,”112 induces something akin to a culturally plotted “biopolitical 
panic”113 and thus it serves as a powerful expulsive mechanism. The foul, 
intemperate, chaotic, oozing “undead” Antiochus, is by this means ultimately 
reclassified, rejected, and retched out by this text as a perilous embodiment of 
repugnant evil. 
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